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OF TEXAS-
WEsrLY A. STURGES*
This is a review and critique of the legislation of Texas relating to
arbitration of civil controversies. The legislation consists chiefly of an
arbitration statute providing for the arbitration of disputes generally
and a separate statute providing for the arbitration of controversies
arising between employers and employees (or their unions).
These pieces of legislation are examined from the viewpoint of deter-
mining how well they facilitate the arbitral process and how well they
are designed to assure the integrity of that process. Questions also occur
as to whether the statutes provide a superior or less useful system of
arbitration than common law arbitration. If parties desire to arbitrate,
should they choose the statutory or the common law system? Has the
judicial administration of the statutes through court decisions facilitated
or deterred their use?
This review of the arbitration legislation of the State is invited not
only by the foregQing questions, but also by Article 16, § 13 of the
Constitution of Texas, which provides that: "It shall be the duty of
the legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary and proper to
decide differences by arbitration, when the parties shall elect that
method of trial."' How well does the foregoing legislation carry out
the duty assigned to the legislature by this constitutional provision?
GENEmAL ARBITRATION STATUTE
The general arbitration system of Texas appears in articles 224-.
238 of the statutes. 2 This legislation is sometimes referred to herein
as the general arbitration statute, and is reprinted and considered in
f Dean Sturges was assisted in the research for this article and in the preparation
of much of the footnote material by Robert L. Blumenthal, LL.B. 1953, University
of Texas.
* Dean and Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
The provision first appeared in the Constitution of 1845. Why it was included has
not been discovered. The Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1845 indicates
that the section was adopted from committee report without debate.2 TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 224-38.
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detail below at pages 842-864. The present statute dates back to 1946.3
There have been comparatively few substantial amendments since then.
It relates only to agreements to submit existing controversies; it does
not purport to embrace arbitration provisions in commercial contracts
or in collective bargaining agreements between employers and em-
ployees (or their unions) providing for settlement of future disputes
which may arise in connection with such contracts or agreements.
Parties may submit "any dispute, controversy, or right of action
supposed to have accrued to either party"4 by signing "an agreement
in writing"- with various matters set forth therein"-, and filing it
with a justice of the peace or clerk of a county or district court, depend-
ing upon the amount in dispute.6
Effect of Statute Upon Common Law Arbitration. The statute ex-
pressly reserves the validity of common law arbitration. Article 238
provides that "Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting the existing
right of parties to arbitrate their differences in such mode as they may
select."'7 Accordingly, if parties do not enter into a submission agree-
s Tex. Laws, 1846 p. 127, approved April 25, 1846. The Arizona arbitration statute
relating to submission of existing controversies and originally enacted in 1901 (Rev.
Stats. 1901, Tit. 111, effective April 19, 1901) is substantially similar. Aiz. CODE AwN.
§27-301-11 (1939). Sections 27-309-11 of the Arizona statute were grafted on the
earlier statute in 1929 (Ariz. Laws 1929, c. 72). They relate to provisions in written
contracts (except collective bargaining agreements) providing for arbitration of future
disputes and are a partial copy of similar provisions in the more modern arbitration
statutes of California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, Wis-
consin, and in the United States arbitration statute. Unfortunately the grafting of the
1929 provisions on the older Arizona statute was not very well done; ambiguities and
burdensome technicalities of the total act make it fully as uninviting to parties who
may desire to use arbitration in Arizona as did the original act.
While the process of adding provisions of the more modern arbitration statutes to
older arbitration statutes may be more expedient in some instances than undertaking
the enactment of a wholly new statute, the Arizona attempt exemplifies the hazards
of such plan.
4 T.x. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 224.
5 T~x. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 225.
6 Tnx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 226.
7 The courts have, of course, recognized that both common law and statutory arbi-
tration are available in Texas. Myers v. Easterwood, 60 Tex. 107 (1883); Owens v.
Withee, 3 Tex. 161 (1848); Lone Star Cotton Mills v. Thomas, 227 S.W.2d 300
(Tex.Civ.App. 1949); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 93 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936);
Temple v. Riverland Co., 228 S.W. 605 (Tex.Civ.App. 1921); Hill v. Walker, 140
S.W. 1159 (Tex.Civ.App. 1911); and see Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros.,
165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947).
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ment which qualifies under the statute, the agreement and any arbitral
proceedings and award thereunder will be judged at common law.,
8 If parties appear to invoke the statute and enter upon a conforming submission
agreement, but they, or the arbitrators, fail thereafter to follow the prescriptions of
the statute so that the award does not qualify for enforcement by the statutory
method, may it, notwithstanding, be enforced by common-law remedies as a common-
law award? May it be vacated by the statutory or by the common-law method?
Concerning the diversity of judicial decisions on these points in other jurisdictions,
see Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards 5-6 (1930); Park Const. Co. v. In-
dependent School Dist., 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475 (1941); Sandford Laundry, Inc.
v. Simon, 285 N.Y. 488,35 N.E.2d 182 (1941).
The Supreme Court of Texas, in an early case, Myers v. Easterwood, 60 Tex. 107
(1883) sustained an award in such a case, the arbitration and award meeting common-
law requirements. The decision was made on cross motions, one to enter judgment
on the award and the other to set it aside. The submission agreement comprehended
the subject matter of a pending action between the parties, declared that it was under
the arbitration statute and contained certain express provisions for proceedings
thereunder in conformity with the statute. Only one person, however, was named by
the parties as arbitrator and he was to act as sole arbitrator. The court declared that
the award was not in compliance with the statute because the submission was to only
one arbitrator, but sustained it as a valid execution of the parties' submission. The
court recognized the problem at hand and the diversity of the authorities as follows:
"We do not propose to enter into an extended consideration of the vexed question as
to whether an arbitration intended by the parties to be under the statute, but for
some reason not carried out in accordance with the statute, should be enforced as a
common law award. The authorities upon this question are conflicting." Id. at 109.
In sustaining the award as at common law the court stated the rationale of its
ruling in these words: "Though the arbitration cannot be sustained as one under the
statute, for the reason that the matter was submitted to one sole arbitrator, while
the statute provides for two, and, in case of their disagreement, for an umpire, yet
we are of the opinion that the parties must be held to have intended that such an
arbitration should be made as would effectually settle the matter of difference between
them, and should be enforceable by the courts.
"In other words, they must be held to have known that their agreement was not
good for an arbitration under the statute; held to have known the law applicable to
their agreement, and to have intended that their agreement should have effect, which
can be given it only by considering it as an arbitration and award good at law, and
without reference to the statute." Id. See also Park Const. Co. v. Independent School
Dist., supra. Compare Owens v. Withee, 3 Tex. 161 (1848).
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 93 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936), a court of civil
appeals approached this general problem but did not pass upon it. An elaborate sub-
mission agreement purported in various provisions to invoke the statute, but in other
provisions matters were stipulated in waiver or contradiction of the statute. A bill
in equity to vacate the award failed. Said the court: "In our opinion, the arbitration
provided for in the arbitration agreement was not a strictly statutory arbitration and
was not intended to be . ..We do not hold that the award was not sufficient as a
statutory award, but we do hold that if it was not, then as against the attack made
upon it, it was sufficient as a common-law award." Id. at 516. Concerning the ex-
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The availability of common law arbitration is of real importance be-
cause the Texas statute-according to its text-is not very inviting to
parties who may desire to arbitrate. Indeed, it seems to have many of the
requirements which parties most desire to escape by arbitration. And it
is notable that the Texas courts have recurringly emphasized that com-
mon law arbitrations, free as they are from the formalities and tech-
nical requirements of the statute as to the agreement, the arbitral board,
the arbitral hearings and award, are to be favored and accorded every
reasonable intendment for validity.
The statute fashions a statutory arbitration as an amicable action.
Control over the initiation of the arbitral proceedings, to the extent of
fixing the time and place thereof, is vested in the justice or clerk with
whom the submission agreement is filed." A provision of uncertain
scope and effect further prescribes that the arbitration "shall proceed
in like manner with trials in the courts of this State."' 0 Provisions as
to the make-up of the arbitral board and for a second and successor
arbitral board make probable the necessity of a repeat arbitration be-
fore a cause can be finally determined." There also is some uncertainty
as to whether or not causes arbitrable under the statute are limited to
those consisting of disputed money claims.12 It also is open to question
whether the arbitral board is expected to decide "according to the evi-
dence adduced and the law and equity applicable to the facts proved,"
as the members of the board are required to take oath to do.13 If the
oath must be followed, judicial review of statutory arbitrations and
awards is extended quite beyond that at common law; and laymen, it
seems, generally will be unqualified to serve as arbitrators under the
statute. In an early case involving the statute the supreme court recog-
nized that "It is difficult to form a clear view of the meaning of many
parts of this act."' 4
These general criticisms are particularized below, pages 842-864, in
comments upon the several articles of the statute. Court decisions which
tended course of litigation between the Ferguson brothers, see further, Ferguson v.
Ferguson, 127 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex.Civ.App. 1939).
In Bell v. Campbell, 143 S.W. 953 (Tex.Civ.App. 1912) the court remarked gen-
erally that the award which was rendered in that case under a future disputes pro-
vision in a building contract should, as to the objections raised against it, be sustained
"both at common law and under the statute."
9 Tax. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 227.
lo Tox. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 230.
11 Tx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 225, 232.
12 Tax. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 226.
13 T-x. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 228.
'4 Owens v. Withee, 3 Tex. 161 (1848).
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have affirmed, clarified or displaced the foregoing provisions of the
statute also are reviewed there.
Causes Which May Be Submitted. Article 224 suggests that a wide
variety of commercial causes and labor controversies may be submitted
under the statute, by providing that parties shall have the right to
submit "any dispute, controversy, or right of action supposed to have
accrued to either party." It may be observed, however, that the text
of the statute lends itself to a construction to the effect that it embraces
the submission of disputed money claims only. Article 226 provides
that the submission agreement shall be filed with a justice of the peace
if "the amount in dispute is two hundred dollars or less," or with the
clerk of the district or county court if "the matter in dispute exceeds
two hundred dollars, exclusive of interest." A court predisposed to
apprehension for arbitration and arbitration statutes 5 might readily
conclude that submissions looking to a declaratory award, such as, for
example, of title, right of possession, of seniority rights, or "just cause"
for discharge of an employee, or to an award of things to be done or
not to be done other than the payment of money, may not be deter-
mined under the statute.8 In determining how comprehensive the
statute is the Texas courts may well be aided by reference to the fore-
going Article 16, § 13 of the Constitution. It seems that a liberal con-
struction of the statute as to what causes may be arbitrated thereunder
would clearly serve the purpose of that constitutional requirement. And
the supreme court early declared, while dealing with another issue
under the statute, that it should receive a liberal construction.17
Revocability and Enforceability: Future Disputes Provisions and Sub-
mission Agreements. Some decisions in the courts of civil appeals have
accorded traditional common law revocability to agreements in com-
mercial contracts to arbitrate disputes which may arise in the future.'
15 See e.g., Goldstein v. Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 328 Pa. 385, 196 A. 43
(1938); Sturges and Ives, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration in Penn-
sylvania, 99 U. or, PA. L. Rav. 727 (1951). The review of the Texas decisions on the
Texas statute as set out later in this article indicates a more liberal attitude by the
courts.
16 In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 93 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936) the court did not
rule out of the statute a submission which it regarded as involving, among other
things, partition of a decedent's estate of which the parties to the submission were
beneficiaries. The question whether the cause was arbitrable under the statute was
not put in issue, however, nor did the court purport to pass upon the question. Sim-
ilarly, see Myers v. Easterwood, 60 Tex. 107 (1883); Alexander v. Witherspoon, 30
Tex. 291 (1867); Crouch v. Crouch, 70 S.W. 595 (Tex.Civ.App. 1902); Smith v.
Clark, 54 S.W. 1052 (Tex. Civ.App. 1900).
'1 Forshey v. Galveston, H. & H. R. R., 16 Tex. 516 (1856).
18 Dozier v. City of Gatesville, 4 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Civ.App. 1928) (revocability
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The supreme court does not appear to have decided the matter. In 1888,
while ruling that a provision for appraisal of loss and damage in a fire
insurance policy is not revocable by action, it did declare that:
"If the stipulation was to deny or repudiate the jurisdiction of the courts
to determine the rights and liability of the parties arising upon the
contract, we would hold, with the weight of authority, such stipulation
void. But here the stipulation does not divest the courts of jurisdiction,
but only binds the parties to have the extent or amount of the loss
determined in a particular way, leaving the question of liability for
such loss to be determined, if necessary, by the parties."'1
Later, in 1897, in a similar case, with a comparable issue as to a provi-
sion for appraisal of loss and damage in a fire insurance policy and a like
decision thereon, the court remarked in passing that it "seems to be
generally held that a stipulation that the question of liability shall be
determined by arbitration is contrary to public policy and void. '20 It
is doubtful that these ancient dicta necessarily commit the court to
rule that the arbitration provisions in current usage are subject to tra-
ditional common-law revocability.
There does not appear to be even a dictum in Texas cases concerning
the revocability of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agree-
ments between employers and their employees (or their unions).
Even if the supreme court finally holds that arbitration provisions in
commercial contracts or collective bargaining agreements are irrevocable
by action and irrevocable by notice, it may be doubted-in the absence
of statutory provision-that positive enforcement would be accorded,
such as an injunction requiring a recalcitrant party to carry out his
arbitration agreement, or to participate in the original appointment of
the arbitral board or in filling vacancies therein, or that, upon his default
in such appointment, a court would make the appointment.21
by action); Queiroli v. Whitesides, 206 S.W. 122 (Tex.Civ.App. 1918) (same); see also
Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1948). Compare
some of the views expressed in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 110 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex.Civ.App.
1937).
An award once rendered under a future disputes provision will, of course, be sus-
tained notwithstanding revocability of the provision up until award. Bell v. Campbell,
143 S.W. 953 (Tex.Civ.App. 1912); see also Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros.
supra; Florida Athletic Club v. Hope Lumber Co., 44 S.W. 10 (Tex.Civ.App. 1898).
29 Scottish Union and National Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 71 Tex. 5, 9-10, 8 S.W. 630, 631
(1888); (Italics by the court).
20 American Central Ins. Co. v. Bass Bros., 90 Tex. 380, 382, 38 S.W. 1110 (1897).
21 For further specification of traditional common-law revocability and non-enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements, see Sturges and Murphy, Some Confusing Matters
[VOL. 31
1953] THE ARBITRATION STATUTES OF TEXAS 839
Apparently it is the intent of the statute that an agreement to submit
an existing controversy, executed and filed in compliance with the stat-
ute, shall thereupon be irrevocable, at least by action. Article 236 pro-
vides as much.
The statute makes no express provision for more positive enforcement
of such agreements, such as by injunctional order for compliance or by
court appointment of the arbitral board when the recalcitrant party
refuses to participate in setting up or maintaining the board. Such en-
forcement is provided, however, in a quite limited particular in article
232. If the two arbitrators, chosen as they are by each party designating
one, fail to agree, they shall appoint an umpire, and article 232 pro-
vides that if they cannot agree upon an umpire then "the justice or
clerk shall select such umpire." Of course this provision appears to be
of narrow scope; it does not purport to touch a case arising, for example,
by reason of the failure or refusal at any time of a recalcitrant party's
appointee to serve, nor one calling for appointment of a substitute arbi-
trator or umpire to fill a vacancy otherwise occurring in the board.
Traditional common-law revocability has been accorded a common
law submission agreement.
23
ABBiTRATION OF LABOR CONTROVERSIES
In addition to the general arbitration statute, Texas has a statute
relating especially to the arbitration of controversies between an em-
ployer and his employees (or their unions) .24 This legislation dates back
Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 580 n. 2 (1952)
The more modern arbitration statutes embrace provisions in written contracts to
arbitrate future disputes arising in connection with the contract and written agree-
ments of submission of existing controversies. In these arbitration statutes it is declared
that arbitration agreements qualifying thereunder "shall be valid, irrevocable and en-
forceable." This is mandatory language; it is a legislative mandate to the courts to
make them so. The declaration alone is sufficient to overcome common-law revocability
by notice. Precise remedies also are accorded the parties to overcome fully common-
law revocability by action and to provide more positive enforcement. These remedies
include the power (1) to stay the trial of any action, suit or other proceeding brought
upon a cause embraced in such arbitration agreement, (2) to obtain an order against
a recalcitrant party requiring him to proceed in compliance with the arbitration agree.
ment, and (3) to procure court appointment of arbitrators to act under the agreement
when a party fails or refuses to participate in the original appointment or to fill a
vacancy occurring in the arbitral board.
22 TEX. Crv. STAT. (Vernon 1948) arts. 225-6.
23 Hill v. Neese, 160 S.W. 314 (Tex.Civ.App. 1913).
24 Tnx. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts 239-49.
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to an Act of 1895.25 There have been no substantial amendments since
its original enactment.
The statute is not inviting to employers and employees who may
desire to arbitrate. This is true because, among other reasons, of the
burdensome, technical requirements which the statute imposes. It pre-
scribes an unwieldy arbitral board of five members: the employer and
the employees each select two; then the four thus selected "shall desig-
nate a fifth person as arbitrator, who shall be chairman of the board. '26
When the board is selected it is required to present a written petition
signed by a majority to the district judge of the county where the dis-
pute arose "praying the license or order of such judge establishing and
approving of said board of arbitration." If the judge shall find "that all
requirements of this law have been complied with," he shall make an
order "establishing such board of arbitration and referring the matters
in dispute to it for hearing, adjudication and determination. '2 7 Each
arbitrator "shall sign a consent to act as such" and subscribe to an oath
before some officer authorized to administer oaths "to faithfully and
impartially discharge his duties as such arbitrator," and such "consent
and oath shall be immediately filed" in the office of the district clerk.28
Art. 242 provides for the submission of controversies in the following
manner:
"The submission shall be in writing, shall be signed by the employer
or receiver and the labor organization representing the employes, or
any laborer or laborers to be affected by such arbitration who may not
belong to any labor organization, shall state the question to be decided,
and shall contain appropriate provisions by which the respective parties
shall stipulate as follows:
1. That pending the arbitration, the existing status prior to any dis-
agreement or strike, shall not be changed.
2. That the award shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the dis-
trict court of the county in which said arbitration is held, and shall be
final and conclusive upon both parties, unless set aside for error of law,
apparent on the record.
3. That the respective parties to the award will each faithfully exe-
,cute the same, and that the same may be specifically enforced in equity
:so far as the powers of a court of equity permit.
4. That the employes dissatisfied with the award shall not, by rea-
:son of such dissatisfaction, quit the service of said employer or receiver
before the expiration of thirty days, nor without giving said employer
-or receiver thirty days written notice of their intention to quit.
25 Tex. Laws 1895, c. 61.
26 T-x, Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 239.
27 Tx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 240.
2 8 TFx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 243.
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5. That said award shall continue in force as between the parties
thereto for the period of one year after the same shall go into practical
operation; and no new arbitration upon the same subject between the
same parties shall be had until the expiration of said one year."
It is further provided that during the pendency of an arbitration under
the act:
"it shall not be lawful for the employer or receiver party to such arbi-
tration, nor his agent, to discharge the employes parties thereto, except
for inefficiency, violation of law, or neglect of duty, or where reduction
of force is necessary nor for the organization representing such em-
ployes to order, nor for the employes to unite in, aid or abet strikes or
boycotts against such employer or receiver." 29
There are other impracticable provisions (at least as of today), such
as those fixing the fee of each arbitrator at the low rate of "three dollars
per day for every day in actual service, not to exceed ten days," and
witness fees at "fifty cents for each days attendance and five cents per
mile traveled by the nearest route."2 0
An award shall be filed in the district clerk's office and, upon being
filed, "shall go into practical operation, and judgment shall be entered
thereon accordingly, at the expiration of ten days from such filing, un-
less within such ten days either party shall file exceptions thereto."
Such exceptions shall lie to "matter of law apparent on the record."'-
From the decision by the district court upon such exceptions either party
may appeal to the court of civil appeals holding jurisdiction thereof; the
decision of the latter court is final. 2
No Texas decisions have been found relating to the administration of
this statute.32
CRI MINAL LA-%S APPLICABLE To ARBITRATIONS
Three articles of the Penal Code relating to bribery are expressly
applicable to arbitrations.3
4
"Whoever shall bribe or offer to bribe" any arbitrator or umpire,
"with intent to influence his decision or bias his opinion in relation to
any cause or matter which may be pending before, or may thereafter by
29 Tax. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 246.
30 Apparently witness fees (per diem) for "attendance on the court" and mileage
allowance are more generous. See Tax. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3708.
3" Tx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 248.
32"TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 249.
33 It is mentioned in Tejas Development Co., v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276
(5th Cir. 1948).
34 Tox. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) arts. 163-5.
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law be submitted" to such arbitrator or umpire shall, upon conviction, be
imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five
years. 5
If any arbitrator or umpire "shall accept, or agree to accept, a bribe
offered for the purpose of biasing or influencing his opinion or judg-
ment, as set forth in the preceding article" he shall, upon conviction,
be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five
years.36
To complete an offense under the foregoing two articles it is not
necessary that the arbitrator or umpire "shall have been actually selected
or appointed; it is sufficient if the bribe be offered or accepted with a view
to the probable appointment or selection of the person to whom the bribe
is offered, or by whom it is accepted."3 7
No Texas decisions have been found involving any of these penal
provisions.
THE GENERAL ARBITRATION STATUTE-THE CRITIQUE PAITICULImZED
Article 224. Right to Arbitrate
All persons desiring to submit any dispute, controversy, or right of
action supposed to have accrued to either party, to arbitration, shall
have the right so to do in accordance with the provisions of this title.
Article 225. Agreement
Such persons shall sign an agreement in writing, as plaintiff and de-
fendant, to arbitrate their differences or matters in dispute, and in
such agreement each party shall name for himself one arbitrator, who
shall be over the age of twenty-one years, not related to either party
by consanguinity or affinity, possessing the qualifications of a juror,
and who is not interested in the result of the cause to be submitted for
his decision.
Designation of parties as litigants. Probably the statute imposes this
apparent duty of self-description by the parties to assimilate statutory
arbitration to an amicable action. "Plaintiff" and "defendant" are, of
course, traditional and useful words to designate parties in civil litiga-
tion, but they serve no useful purpose in arbitrations. The basis of the
designations for litigation is absent in arbitrations-even those under
this statute. The impediment of this requirement will be especially
noticeable when parties undertake a submission of their disputes over
title, ownership, or rights of possession, 8 boundary lines, interpreta-
tions of documents, or money claims with counterclaims.
3 5 T x. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 163.3 Tmx. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 164.
37 Tax. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 165. A "bribe" is defined in article 177 of
the penal code.
38 See, e.g., the submission in Myers v. Easterwood, 60 Tex. 107 (1883).
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Parties will think twice before agreeing upon their respective desig-
nations, since some advantages and disadvantages may attend their re-
spective designations. This appears from article 230 relating to procedure
at the hearing. It provides that "the trial of the cause shall proceed in
like manner with trials in the courts of this State, the plaintiff holding
the affirmative, and entitled to open and conclude the argument."3 9
But just what "the affirmative" involves is not clear unless it may in-
dicate that the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the law of evidence,
with presumptions and burdens of proof, control or have some signifi-
cance in the arbitral hearing. That the views of the courts tend to belie
such control is indicated by the discussion of article 233, below, pages
861-864.
In short, the parties may be apprehensive in styling themselves, one
as "plaintiff" and one as "defendant," since the significance of doing so
is not at all evident. At all events, it seems clear that this requirement
does not facilitate the use of the statute nor contribute, in any respect
to the integrity of the arbitral process.
The supreme court once indicated that it was puzzled by the fore-
going requirement. It speculated that the designations "may have been
intended and used in reference to the party claiming satisfaction, com-
pensation, or redress of a supposed wrong, and the party from whom
it was sought to be obtained." 40 No further conclusion on the matter has
been discovered in the Texas cases. While the text says that the parties
"shall" sign "as plaintiff and defendant," perhaps the supreme court
ultimately will conclude that "may" is all that is intended-and that
the provision is of no significant consequence. If so, why have it in the
statute?
Concerning the arbitral board. It is not clear why the statute should
make any such prescription as to the arbitral board and the formalizing
of it in the submission agreement. Why should the parties be required
to name their arbitrators in the agreement? Why should the statute
prescribe the constituency of the arbitral board? These questions are
prompted by the over-all consideration of how such provisions facilitate
the arbitral process or assure its integrity.
To hold that the text of article 225 is mandatory so as to preclude
the parties from naming a single arbitrator, or an odd number of arbi-
trators, would be to create the unfortunate situation in which arbitra-
tions under the statute might result in no award, if there were disagree-
ment between the two arbitrators (each party appointing one). Indeed,
the statute appears to anticipate as much in article 232. Provision is
39 Italics supplied.
40 Owens v. Withee, 3 Tex. 161, 165 (1848).
TEXAS LAW REVIEW
they "shall select an umpire"; if they cannot agree in the choice of an
umpire, "the justice or clerk shall select such umpire"; and then "the
cause may be tried anew at such time as the board of arbitration thus
constituted may designate" and "with like proceedings" as are pre-
scribed in the preceding article for the original proceedings.
If these provisions of the statute are to be taken at face value, it is
doubted that greater deterrents could be devised to discourage arbitra-
tion under the statute.
It also should be noted that the "umpire" selected by the two arbi-
trators, or by the justice or clerk, as the case may be, must have like
qualifications as an arbitrator.4' As appears from article 225 an arbitra-
tor must, among other things, possess "the qualifications of a juror." The
vague and technical requirements (both qualitative and factual) for
jury duty42 provide inviting opportunity for a recalcitrant party to tie
up any repeat arbitration by litigating the qualifications of the "um-
pire" so selected or appointed.
The Texas decisions have wrought a little clarification of the statute
on the foregoing matters; it is doubtful that more could reasonably have
been expected. The supreme court took account in an early case of the
frailties of the provision of article 225 regarding the probable necessity
of a repeat arbitration following the failure of the original two arbitra-
tors to agree upon an award. In Forshey v. Galveston, H. &f H. R.R.43
the submission agreement provided that each party should select one
arbitrator and that the two so chosen should select a "third man." It was
further provided that all three should "sit and act as arbitrators," but
that a decision by all three or any two of them should be final and bind-
ing. Apparently all three participated in the arbitral hearing; and it is
reported that "the award purported to be the decision of a majority of the
arbitrators, but was signed by all." Whether the third man chosen by the
original two constituted part of the majority does not appear. Neither
the names of the two arbitrators appointed by the parties nor that of the
third man appointed by the two were given in the submission agreement.
Their names were, however, subsequently indorsed upon the agreement
-but when or by whom does not appear.
The lower court denied enforcement of the award for want of com-
pliance with the statute. The supreme court reversed, holding that the
41 Tnx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 232.
42 For example, he must be "of sound mind and good moral character" Tnx. Cv.
STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 2133; and may be disqualified for a cause which, in the
opinion of the court, renders him unfit to sit. Tnx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 2144;
and consult Johnson v. Korn, 117 S.W.2d 514 (Tex.Civ.App. 1938); Brulay v. Brooks,
50 S.W. 647 (Tex.Civ.App. 1898).
43 16 Tex. 516 (1856).
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award was a valid statutory award and enforceable by the statutory pro-
cedure. It posed the issue before it as follows:
"If the Court [below] was right in its judgment, it must be because,
by the agreement of the parties, the two arbitrators chosen by them
were empowered to choose and did choose a third arbitrator or umpire,
before they had heard the evidence and ascertained that they could
not agree; for in every other respect there was literal compliance with
the statute.""4
The court took occasion to emphasize that the statute should be lib-
erally construed at least to the point, in this case, of sustaining the ad-
vance selection of the third man so as to obviate a potential repeat arbi-
tration. Said the court:
"It cannot be doubted that the parties have adopted and pursued,
substantially, the statutory remedy. If they have not entitled them-
selves to all the benefits of that mode of trial, it is because there has not
been a technical compliance with the very letter of the statute, in re-
spect to the time of choosing an umpire; and because the proceeding
under the statute is to be construed strictly so as to require an exact,
technical and literal compliance with its provisions. It must be admitted
that this would be to apply to this statute and the proceedings under it,
a strictness of construction which has never been applied, and is not
warranted by any principle by which Courts are governed, in the con-
struction of statutes regulating civil proceedings in general. . . . To
call that a liberal construction, in furtherance of the remedy, which
should deny parties the benefit of that remedy, merely because, for
their mutual convenience, they had anticipated and provided in ad-
vance, against the necessity of a second trial, in the event of the dis-
agreement of the arbitrators chosen by them would be an abuse of
terms. . . . What is the substance of the provision to be complied with
according to its fair and obvious meaning and intent? It is that each
party shall choose an arbitrator; and to ensure a decision, if they dis-
agree, they shall select an umpire (Hart. Dig. Art. 10, 12). All this
has been done. Can it make any difference in effect and substance, that,
with the consent of the parties, the arbitrators chose the umpire before
they had disagreed? Can that be a fatal departure from any indis-
pensable or essential requirement of the statute? It seems, there was
a disagreement; for the award, though signed by all, purports to be the
award of a majority. That majority must have been, either the two
chosen by the parties; in which case there having been an umpire
chosen was a merely unnecessary and immaterial matter; or it was the
concurrence of one of them with the umpire; in which case the event
must have happened, which rendered the choosing of an umpire neces-
sary: and whether he was chosen before or after the disagreement, it
4Id. at 526. It may be noted in passing that it does not appear from the report of
the submission agreement that the parties had designated themselves as "plaintiff"
and "defendant"; the matter was not mentioned.
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there made that "if the arbitrators chosen as aforesaid cannot agree"
would seem, was a matter equally unimportant and immaterial. Upon
either supposition, the award was rendered precisely in the manner,
which the statute contemplates. The course pursued was convenient
and expedient; ensuring a decision, without the trouble and expense
of two trials: and convenience and expediency are always consulted in
administering remedies in civil proceedings.11
45
Prior to the Forshey case, in 1848, in Owens v. Withee," the court
had ruled an award invalid under the statute and non-enforceable by the
statutory method. Although the submission agreement recited that the
arbitration was to be had "according to the statute in such case made
and provided," it named seven arbitrators. It further recited that the
parties agreed to abide the award "under the penalty of two thousand
dollars for the forfeiture of the party failing to comply with said award."
The court appears to have based its decision chiefly upon two grounds,
namely, (1) that the naming of seven arbitrators did not conform to the
statutory provision for two, and, (2) that, by the penalty stipulation,
the parties planned to forego the statutory remedy for enforcing a valid
statutory award. Said the court:
"The law provides for only two arbitrators, unless an umpire should
become necessary; they have chosen six [seven]. The law provides the
mode of enforcing the award. The agreement does not seem to have
contemplated that it would be made the judgment of the court [the
statutory method of enforcing a statutory award, Art. 231], but pro-
vides a penalty for the non-performance of either party, of what should
be required of by the award.
"It seems very clear, therefore, that the proceedings were not in
conformity to the statute, and the award could not legally be made the
judgment of the court. '47
In the Forshey case the court concluded that Owens v. Withee was
"plainly distinguishable" and pointed out that
"instead of three arbitrators, that is, two, with a third as an umpire,
as the statute contemplates, seven were chosen and named in the agree-
ment; which, moreover, provided that their award should be 'final,
under the penalty of two thousand dollars, for the forfeiture of the
party failing to comply with said award.' The award was signed by
five only of the arbitrators. The submission and proceedings in that
case, were not at all in conformity to the statute; and, consequently, it
was held that the award was not a good statutory award."48
45 Id. at 526-8.
46 3 Tex. 161 (1848).
47 Id. at 165.
48Forshey v. Galveston H. & H. R. R. Co., 16 Tex. 516 (1856). The submission
agreement in the Forshey case stipulated that the award should be paid in cash within
ten days after notice of the award. The court held that this stipulation did not displace
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Several years after the Forshey case the supreme court in Myers v.
Easterwood,9 was called upon to determine the validity of an award
rendered under a submission agreement wherein the parties named one
and the same person to act as sole arbitrator. It declared that the award
could not be enforced under the statute.
In Owens v. Withee it is readily inferred that the parties appeared at
the arbitral hearings; in Myers v. Easterwood such inference is, to say
the least, more speculative. At all events the objection to the constituency
of the arbitral board first appeared in the trial court. No consideration
was given these matters by the supreme court, nor suggestion made as to
the possibility of "waiver" of the defect in the arbitral boards resulting
from participation in the arbitral hearing without pertinent objection.
Quite clearly the foregoing decisions by the supreme court teach that
the parties, to comply with the statute, must commit their submission to
an arbitral board of not more than three nor less than two. While the
Forshey case is not free from all doubt as to its scope of application,50 it
probably may be said that parties may submit to two named "arbitra-
the statute and distinguished the stipulation from that in Owens v. Withzee as follows:
"If, in this case, as in the case of Owens v. Withee.. ., the parties had contemplated
a different remedy from that given by the statute, by the very terms of the agreement
securing performance of the award by a penalty, there might be more reason to hold
that they had waived their right to enforce performance in the mode provided by the
statute. But they had not done so, but have simply agreed to perform within a sped-
fled time. In the absence of any express agreement, the law would imply one; and
it is because of this express agreement that the legal remedy is given where there is
no express agreement; but it would be quite preposterous to hold that an express agree-
ment to perform an award within a specified time would deprive the party entitled
to demand performance of the remedy provided in case of its breach." Id. at 531.
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 93 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936) the submission agree-
ment stipulated that "if either of said parties shall neglect, fail or refuse to adhere
to the provisions of these agreements, or to carry into effect, or abide the award of
said Board of Arbitration, he shall forfeit to the opposite party $35,000 as liquidated
damages." The court does not appear to have given any special attention to the pro-
vision--certainly not as to its significance in determining whether or not the award
rendered thereunder constituted a valid statutory award. The stipulation was later
held enforceable in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 110 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex.Civ.App. 1937).
4 9 60 Tex. 107 (1883)
50 If the submission were to three named arbitrators (rather than to two who were
to select a "third man") the question would arise whether it would qualify as a sub-
mission under the statute when a submission naming seven arbitrators or only one ar-
bitrator does not. In Crouch v. Crouch, 70 S.W. 595 (Tex.Civ.App. 1902), the sub-
mission was to three named arbitrators, but the point was not considered; see further,
Bell v. Campbell, 143 S.W. 953 (Tex.Civ.App. 1912).
Or suppose, for example, that the two arbitrators originally appointed (one by each
party) had been unable to agree upon or select the "third man" who was, by the sub-
mission agreement, to "sit and act" as one of the arbitrators-would the justice or clerk
TEXAS LAW REVIEW
tors" with authority or direction to select a third "arbitrator" before they
start the hearings, and, by authorizing a majority award, they can avoid
the hazard of a repeat hearing. Whether or not the third member must
be "named" in the submission agreement, or endorsed thereon by author-
ity, express or implied, of the parties is not clear. If the submission
stipulates an additional sanction (such as a penal sum) for performance
of the award, there is hazard to its enforceability by the statutory
method.
Filing of submission agreement and control of the arbitral proceed-
ings. The next two articles of the statute, 226 and 227, providing for the
filing of the submission agreement with a justice of the peace or clerk
of the district or county court and delegating control to the justice
or clerk over the arbitral proceedings, are, when taken literally, prob-
ably the most likely deterrents to the use of statutory arbitration. The
text of these two articles will be observed together with an account of
the Texas decisions which may be said to have more or less displaced
their requirements. The articles read as follows:
Article 226. Agreement filed
If the amount in dispute is two hundred dollars or less, exclusive of
interest, such agreement shall be filed with some justice of the peace
of the county in which the defendant resides or in which the contro-
versy arose. If the matter in dispute exceeds two hundred dollars, ex-
clusive of interest, then such agreement shall be filed with the clerk
of the district or county court of the county in which the controversy
arose, according as the amount involved, or matter in dispute, may
come within the jurisdiction of one court or the other.
Article 227. Day of Trial designated
When such agreement is filed, the justice of the peace or the clerk
of county or district court, as the case may be, shall forthwith desig-
nate a day for the trial of the cause, not less than two days thereafter,
and shall issue process for such witnesses as either party may desire,
returnable on the day fixed for trial.
Why should an arbitration statute require that the submission agree-
ment be filed with any justice of the peace or the clerk of any court?
be authorized under Article 232 infra, to select him-and to do so before the original
hearings?
It also should be noted that distinctions are frequently drawn, on certain issues, be-
tween "arbitrators," "additional" or "third arbitrator," and "umpires"; between an
"umpire" to decide the whole cause and an "umpire" to decide only items of disagree-
ment as they occur from time to time between the arbitrators in the course of their
proceedings. See STURGES, CO-MERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDS 144 (1930).
Whether the "umpire" contemplated by article 232 may or may not be an "arbi-
trator" or "third arbitrator" as seems to have been planned in the submission agreement
in the Forshey case, see the discussion of article 232, in!ra.
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Parties are not likely to desire to make their controversy or their sub-
mission of it to arbitration a public record. There is no such requirement
at common law. How does such a provision facilitate the arbitral process
or assure its integrity?
Article 226 also provides that the submission agreement shall be filed
in the county "in which the controversy arose," except that when it shall
be filed with a justice of the peace, it shall be filed either in such county
or in the county in which "the defendant" resides. It seems likely that
many controversies which otherwise might qualify for submission under
the statute will be clouded by uncertainty as to their county of origin;
and the provision for filing in the county in which "the defendant" re-
sides adds further challenge to the process whereby the parties are to
style themselves as "plaintiff and defendant" as prescribed in article
225, above. Granting that the parties are successful in coming to original
agreement upon their respective designations as "plaintiff" and "de-
fendant," these further uncertainties as to where it shall be filed invite
litigation which may bring an otherwise honest and competent arbitra-
tion and award to an abortive ending'.
Article 227 purports to nullify the flexibility for arranging the time
and place of hearings accorded the parties and arbitrators in com-
mon law arbitrations and in statutory arbitrations in most jurisdictions.
Seemingly, neither the arbitral board nor the parties are to arrange the
time or place of the arbitral hearings; the justice or the clerk, as the case
may be, is designated to handle these matters. Moreover, according to
the text of the next succeeding article (Article 228) a quorum of the
arbitrators is expected to assemble at the time and place of hearing,
as scheduled by the justice or clerk, and take the prescribed oath. This
seems to be required even if no more is expected than that they will post-
pone the time of hearing. The arbitrators, being sworn by him, may
postpone and adjourn hearings as provided in article 229; there is no
provision for the justice or clerk to do so. Article 229 provides in this
respect that "after being sworn" the arbitrators may "for good cause
shown, continue the hearing to some other day," and "for good cause
may adjourn the same over to some other time."
Why is there this division of authority in regard to fixing the original
time and place of the arbitral proceedings and their postponement and ad-
journment? Why should the justice or clerk be vested with power to fix
even the original time ("not less than two days thereafter") and place of
hearing when such matters concern only the mutual convenience of the
parties and the arbitrators? Are the arbitrators less competent to fix the
original hearing than a continuance? And even if the justice or clerk is
inclined to speed up the proceedings by setting an early date of hearing
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may it be made abortive at the hands of the parties and arbitrators? If
the justice or clerk should see fit to fix a date in the distant future or other-
wise frustrate an -early arbitration, what can the parties do, other than
change over to a common law arbitration?
This division of authority over the initiation and the continuance of
the arbitral proceedings seems to serve no useful purpose.
"Waiver" of the requirements of articles 226 and 227. If the fore-
going provisions of articles 226 and 227 may be stipulated away by
the parties without taking an award out of the statute and displacing
the statutory method of enforcing it, the utility of the statute will be
remarkably improved. If the provisions may be stipulated away the
question should be emphasized: why should they be included in the
statute at all?
There is some authority in the Texas cases to the effect that the sub-
mission agreement need not be filed until the award is rendered and
ready to be filed in connection with statutory proceedings to have judg-
-ient entered upon the award. It has been said that the provision for the
earlier filing "may be waived."
Thus, in Temple v. Riverland Co.1 it was said to be no defense to the
enforcement of an award by the statutory procedure that the submission
agreement was not filed with the clerk of the court until after the award
had been rendered and was ready to be filed. On motion to enter judgment
on the award the trial court made findings of fact that the submission
agreement was not filed with the clerk until after the award, "nor did the
clerk of the district court have anything to do with said arbitration other
than the filing with him of the agreement to arbitrate and the award of
the arbitration, which was done several days after the award was made."
Nevertheless, on statutory motion therefor, judgment was -entered upon
the award in the court below. The judgment was sustained on appeal. The
court, on the appeal, observed that:
"The fact that the agreement was not filed with the clerk before the
award was a matter which could be waived. The arbitrators were sworn,
set the hearing, and all the parties appeared before them without any
objection appearing either then or afterwards that the agreement had
not been filed."'52
In short, the parties and arbitrators seem to have by-passed the clerk and
his role as prescribed in articles 227 and 228. The arbitrators (rather than
the clerk under Article 227) set the hearing. Who swore the arbitrators
and by what authority does not appear.
51228 S.W. 605 (Tex.Civ.App. 1921).
52 Id. at 606; see Hallv. Little, 11 Tex. 404 (1854).
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In ruling that the filing of the submission agreement after the award
did not preclude entry of judgment upon the award as provided in the
statute the court said, "Articles 68 and 69, R. C. S. (now arts. 226 and
227) provide that the agreement shall be filed with the clerk, but these
matters of procedure may be waived." The court added that the objection
had not been taken in the court below and that "the appellate court will
presume the matter was waived."
If the filing of the submission agreement as prescribed in article 226
and the role of the justice or clerk under articles 227 and 228 can be so
completely "waived" in retrospect (after the parties have engaged in the
arbitral hearings without objection), the question naturally occurs: Can
the parties safely stipulate the "waiver" in advance without prejudice to
the award and without displacing the statutory remedy of enforcing it?
And if the parties may so stipulate away those articles, why put them to
the occasion of doing so; in other words, why are the requirements in the
statute? Clearly enough, they do not simplify the arbitral process.
It seems doubtful that Temple v. Riverland Co. can be fully relied upon
to support an advance stipulation of waiver of the statutory require-
ments; probably it is safest to conclude that the "waiver" in that case
was derived chiefly from the thesis of the court that "the appellate court
will presume that the matter was waived," the objection not having been
raised in the court below.
Possibly Hall v. Morris"3 should be recognized as ruling that parties
may stipulate away in advance the preliminary filing of the submission
agreement as provided in article 226, the roles of the justice or clerk in
initiating the arbitral hearing as prescribed in article 227, and the swear-
ing in of the arbitrators before they proceed with the hearing as provided
in article 228. The supreme court there declared that they are "merely
directory" and may be "waived."
The defendant in that case pleaded an award in bar to an action
brought upon the cause which had been submitted to arbitration. The ar-
bitration and award were proved and it was made to appear that both
parties had appeared before the arbitrators. It did not, the court ob-
served, "affirmatively appear that any day was assigned by the district
clerk for the trial." The court held that the trial court was in error in
charging that the award was invalid for want of compliance with the
statute. In so holding, the court declared that the provision of the statute
for the clerk to initiate the arbitral hearing by fixing the date thereof is
"directory only" and may be "waived" by the parties. "They may waive
this action on the part of the clerk," said the court, "and fix their own
53 30 Tex. 280 (1867).
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day for the trial, and an award made under these circumstances will be
good under the statute."
While the course of conduct of the parties by engaging in the arbitral
hearing without objection made it too late, after award, for the larty
(the plaintiff) to object to the award on the given ground (that after
such course of action by the party there was a "waiver" in retrospect),
it is not clear that the court thereby became committed to the proposition
that parties can stipulate in advance so to by-pass the justice or clerk and
still not displace the award as a statutory award and its enforcement
under the statute. And of course the award in this case was being used
by the defendant to defeat the action on the cause which was submitted;
no positive aid by statutory remedy was sought. The court indicated
moreover that the objecting party (the plaintiff) might readily have
obviated the "waiver" as follows:
"The proper time to raise this objection is when the arbitrators are
about to proceed with the trial, provided the parties are present. But
if the arbitrators go on with the trial, without either or both the parties
being before them, then the objection that there was no day assigned
by the clerk for the investigation, as provided by the statute, may well
be taken for the first time in the district court."5'
Of course, if the party objecting to the award (the plaintiff) had
originally stipulated away the matters found to have been "waived" in
retrospect by his engaging in the arbitral hearing without objection, it is
not difficult to understand that the party could not deny the "waiver"
with good grace toward the stipulation under either of the foregoing
circumstances indicated by the court.
In Alexander & Beauchamp v. Mulhall & Scaling" the Commission
of Appeals went a long way, at least, toward ruling expressly and pre-
cisely that advance stipulation by the parties displacing the role of the
justice or clerk under articles 226 and 227 is permissible without taking
the award out of the statute and its enforcement procedure. It was stipu-
lated in the submission agreement that a named justice of the peace
should swear the witnesses and arbitrators and that the award should
be entered as a judgment of the district court and that "It shall only
be necessary for the person or persons in whose favor the award may be
made to file in said court this agreement and the award.. . ."6 It is
further reported in the case that the named justice certified to swear-
ing the arbitrators and witnesses; also that the parties engaged in the
hearing. After the award the submission agreement and award were
54 d. at 282-3.
55 1 Posary Umni. GAs. 764 (Tex.Comm.App. 1881).
56 Id. at 765 (Italics supplied).
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filed in the district court with motion by the successful party to have
judg~nent entered on the award. Objections to the motion included, among
others, that the submission agreement had not been previously filed
with the clerk of the court and that the clerk had not fixed the day of
the original hearing by the arbitrators. The objections were overruled
in the court below. On exceptions duly taken the ruling was affirmed by
the commission of appeals. Said that court, "It was perfectly compe-
tent for these parties to waive the antecedent filing of the agreement,
as they did by expressly providing for its filing with the award, with
the further agreement attaching to the proceedings all the qualities of the
statutory award. A substantial compliance with the statute is all that is
required to make it such.157
Of course, the objecting party had participated in the arbitral pro-
ceedings without questioning their validity so that the decision might
for that reason have been put on the rationale of "waiver" as used in
the foregoing earlier cases. The court did not, however, purport so to
restrict its ruling, but, instead, seems to have placed it upon the express
provision in the submission agreement "for the filing with the award."
Perhaps it did so intending positively to indicate that the objecting party
cannot subsequently raise objection on the point in the face of his stipu-
lation, either before the arbitrators or in the court below under the cir-
cumstances indicated in the concluding part of the opinion in Hall v.
Morris, quoted above, in which there was no such stipulation."8
In view of the role purported to be assigned to the justice or clerk in
articles 226, 227 and, indeed, in article 228, one is hesitant to conclude
that so much of this statute can be by-passed by stipulation alone without
disqualifying the award under the statute and displacing statutory en-
forcement of it. Perhaps the strongest test of the matter will occur when
attempt is made to revoke a submission agreement deferring the filing
of the agreement until award is rendered (or later) and displacing the
functioning of the justice or clerk, and the revocation is resisted by
endeavor to qualify it under article 236, infra, page 863. That article
provides that "after an agreement to arbitrate is filed" it is irrevocable
by action. It is not likely in such case that there will have occurred any
57 Id. at 768 (Italics supplied).
58 When the'record in proceedings under the statute to enforce or to vacate the award
is silent on the matter and no objection to the point is taken in the trial court, apparently
it will be presumed, on appeal, that there has been compliance with articles 226 and
227. This presumption seems to be even stronger when the record discloses that the
parties engaged in the arbitral proceedings without raising the objection there. See
McHugh v. Peck, 29 Tex. 141 (1867); Hall v. Little, 11 Tex. 404 (1854); Offeciers v.
Dirks, 2 Tex. 468 (1847); Temple v. Riverland Co., 228 S.W. 605 (Tex.Civ.App. 1921).
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"waiver" in the retrospect of the parties having participated without
objection in an arbitral hearing until the award.59
Article 228. Oath of Arbitrators
On the assembling of the arbitrators on the day of trial, the justice
or clerk shall administer an oath to each, substantially as follows: "You
do solemnly swear that you will fairly and impartially decide the mat-
ter in dispute between the parties, according to the evidence adduced
and the law and equity applicable to the facts proved. So help you God."
If this article means what it says and the arbitrators are to follow their
oath, they must decide according to "the law and equity applicable to the
facts proved." Moreover, in article 230 it is provided that "the trial of the
cause shall proceed in like manner with trials in the courts of the state,
the plaintiff holding the affirmative, and entitled to open and conclude
the argument." This further suggests that the arbitral board may be
bound by the law and equity of the case and by the law of evidence, in-
cluding presumptions and burdens of proof, applicable to trials of such
causes in the courts of the state.
On the other hand, there is no provision in the statute for vacating an
award because the arbitral board committed error in determining "the
law and equity applicable to the facts proved" or for failure to follow the
manner of trials in the courts of the state. (If the parties stipulate for
appeal from an award as provided in article 233, the cause will be open
to "trial de novo" in the courts.) The decisions of the Texas courts0 in-
dicate that awards are not (in absence of stipulation for appeal) subject
to judicial review on such grounds and that they may be set aside only
for limited causes which do not include these errors.
If the arbitral board may disregard "the law and equity applicable to
the facts proved" and if it may disregard the law, including the law of
evidence and the presumptions and burdens of proofs applicable to trials
of like causes in the courts of the state, it is not clear why the arbitra-
tors should be required to take the oath in article 228, nor why the re-
quirement should be written in article 230 that their hearings shall be in
like manner as trials in the courts. Texas decisions indicate, however,
that the prescribed oath is mandatory unless the parties "waive" it. It is
59 In passing, reference may be made to Warren v. Tinsley, 53 Fed. 689 (6th Cir.
1893), to question whether the clerk of a federal court may carry out the role of the
clerk under the Texas statute. It appears to have been taken for granted in that case
that parties to a suit in federal court could effectively invoke the Texas arbitration
statute and refer the pending cause to arbitration thereunder by executing the pre-
scribed submission agreement and filing it in that court rather than with a justice or
clerk of a county or district court of Texas.
60 These cases are reviewed in the discussion of Article 233, infra.
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inferred further that under the decisions the parties may waive it by
stipulation in advance and that they can do so without displacing the
statute. Again the question recurs, if this oath is inconsequential to the
course of conduct of the arbitrators or if it may be waived by the parties,
why should they be required to take it?
According to the decisions, if either an arbitrator or an umpire is not
duly sworn and the objection is duly taken, the award is unenforceable
under the statute. It was so held in one case even though there was a stipu-
lation to dispense with the oath, when it was not made to appear that the
attorney who represented the objecting party had any authority to waive
the requirement.61
Article 229. Continuances permissible
After being sworn, the arbitrators may, for good cause shown, con-
tinue the hearing to some other day, and during the progress of any
trial, for good cause, may adjourn the same over to some other time.
While pleadings, such as, for example, an "answer" setting forth a
counterclaim, probably are not required in arbitrations under the statute,
quite clearly the party against whom the counterclaim is asserted is en-
titled not only to reasonable opportunity to contest it when it is presented
before the arbitrators but also, if necessary, to have the arbitral hearings
postponed to enable him to organize his'evidence to meet it. 62
Article 230. Procedure on trial
Any arbitrator shall administer the necessary oath to the witnesses,
and the trial of the cause shall proceed in like manner with trials in
the courts of this State, the plaintiff holding the affirmative, and entitled
to open and conclude the argument.
Article 231. Award entered as judgment
After hearing the evidence and arguments, if any, the arbitrators
shall agree upon their award and reduce the same to writing, specify-
ing plainly their decision, which award they shall file with the justice
or clerk as the case may be, and at the succeeding term of the court if
no appeal is applied for such award shall be entered and recorded as
the judgment of the court, with like effect as other judgments of said
court.
61 Anderson v. City of Fort Worth, 83 Tex. 107, 18 S.W. 483 (1892). The report of
the case does not mention whether the parties engaged in the arbitral hearing. See also,
Warren v. Tinsley, 63 Fed. 689 (5th Cir. 1893). Compare Alexander & Beauchamp v.
Mulhall & Scaling, 1 Posey Unrep. Gas. 764 (Tex.Comm.App. 1881) discussed in the
comment on Article 227, supra. When the record in proceedings under the statute to
enforce or to vacate an award is silent on the matter, and the objection has not been
raised in the court below, it will be presumed, on appeal, that the arbitrators and um-
pire were duly sworn. Hall v. Little, l Tex. 404 (1854). See also Offeciers v. Dirks, 2
Tex. 468 (1847).
62 See McHugh v. Peck, 29 Tex. 141 (1867).
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Concerning the award, its enforcement and impeachment. Probably
an award need not be itemized as to the matters which are determined
by it unless the parties stipulate therefor."
It is reversible error to enter judgment upon an award at the same term
of a district court as when it is filed. The supreme court remarked upon
the effect of the foregoing provision of the statute as follows:
"The meaning of this section of the statute is unmistakable: it au-
thorizes the rendition of judgment at the first regular term ,of the court
after the award is made, and not before. .... The plaintiff in error
could have waived the time and consented to the entry of the judgment
of that term. But the record does not show that she did this, and such
consent or waiver cannot be presumed."64
But apparently, judgment may be entered after the succeeding term,
and it has been held that an award may be pleaded in bar'to an action
upon the cause which was submitted, although the award has not been
made a judgment of court, and although the next succieing term of the
court has passed. To quote the supreme court:
"The statute requiring judgment at the first regular term after award
made was evidently intended to prevent it from being taken before the
losing party should have an opportunity of filing his objections to the
award. The fact that he has been allowed six months' additional time
within which to make the objections cannot certainly furnish him with
grounds of complaint.
This suit [on the cause submitted] was brought to the "econd term
of the court after the award was made. It was the privilege of the de-
fendant, in whose favor it was rendered, to have it entered up as the
judgment of the court at that term. She pleads it as a bar to the de-
mand of the plaintiff, and, in effect, asks that it may then be made ajudgment final and decisive of the controversy between the parties."6 5
The motion to have judgment -ntered upon the award has been dis-
tinguished from an action or suit, and the entry of judgment has been
described as being "only a ministerial act." A foreign corporation was
allowed to maintain the proceedings although it was not authorized to do
business in the state prior to that time, and although the arbitration and
award concerned business transactions between the parties in the state.
With respect to the application of the provisions of the statutes which
provide that a foreign corporation cannot "maintain any suit or action,
either legal or equitable, in any of the courts of this state, upon any
demand" unless the corporation has been duly authorized to do business
in the state, the court declared that the proceeding by motion to have
63 See Smith v. Clark, 54 S.W. 1052 (Tex.Civ.App. 1900).
64 Alexander v. Witherspoon, 30 Tex. 291, 295 (1867). See also Crouch v. Crouch,
70 S.W. 595 (Tex.Civ.App. 1902); Brulay v. Brooks, 50 S.W. 647 (Tex.Civ.App. 1899).
65 Hall v. Morris, 30 Tex. 280, 283 (1867).
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judgment entered upon the award was not within those provisions. It
said:
"We conclude that, in entering into an agreement to arbitrate, the
trial before .the arbitrators and the award is not, within the meaning of
the statute, the maintenance of a suit or action in a court of this state,
from which a foreign corporation would be excluded. That the judg-
ment entered on the award by the district court was only a ministerial
act and not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties, grow-
ing out of ihe original contract made by the parties in this state.166
A judgnient setting aside an award is an equally "final judgment" for
purposes of appeal.7 And the court, on appeal, will, if error is found,
enter such judgment as the court below should have entered. Thus, in
Forshey v. Galveston, H. & H. R.R. Co.,65 the supreme court, after hold-
ing that the district court erred in setting aside an award and refusing to
enter judgment upon it, further held that, upon reversing the judgment,
it would "proceed to render such judgment or decree as the court below
should have rendered." A court of civil appeals has held likewise when
error was found on the part of the lower court in not setting aside an
award. Said the court:
"This court should render the judgment which should have been en-
tered by the trial court. Judgment of the trial court is, therefore, re-
versed, and judgment here rendered setting aside the award of the
arbitrators entered as the judgment of that court, without prejudice,
however, to any rights of either party arising under their contract."69
Article 232. Umpire selected
If the arbitrators chosen as aforesaid cannot agree, they shall select
an umpire with like qualifications as themselves, or in case they dis-
agree in the choice of an umpire, the justice or clerk shall select such
umpire, and he shall be sworn in like manner as the arbitrators; and
the cause may be tried anew at such time as the board or arbitration
thus constituted may designate, with like proceedings as are prescribed
in the preceding article.
The Texas decisions, as well as the statute, leave considerable un-
certainty as to who this "umpire" is. Is he in fact an "umpire," or an
additional or third "arbitrator;" is he to decide the whole cause once
the two arbitrators originally appointed have failed to agree; or is he
66Templeton v. Riverland Co., 228 S.W. 605, 610 (Tex.Civ.App. 1921). See also
Fortune v. Killebrew, 86 Tex. 172,23 S.W. 976 (1893).67 King v. Grey, 31 Tex. 22 (1868).
6816 Tex. 516 (1856).
69 Evans v. DeSpain, 37 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex.Civ.App. 1930). See further Fortune
v. Killebrew, 86 Tex. 172, 23 S.W. 976 (1893); King v. Grey, 31 Tex. 22 (1868); com-
pare Brulay v. Brooks, 50 S.W. 647 (Tex.Civ.App. 1899).
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to decide only items of disagreement as they occur from time to time
between the two arbitrators? Is he a proper party to the quorum of the
two arbitrators before they disagree; are he and they both necessary, or
proper, to a quorum after they have disagreed and he has been selected?
Must, or may, both arbitrators and umpire join in an award?
In 1856 in the Forshey case reviewed above, the supreme court ruled
that the provisions in a submission agreement providing for the selection
of an umpire (the "third man") before the two arbitrators disagreed,
and permitting him to sit and to act with the two arbitrators as appointed
by the parties from the beginning of the arbitral hearings as an arbitra-
tor, did not transgress the provisions of the statute as to the constituency
of the arbitral board. His selection before disagreement by the two and
his participation with them in the hearing also appears to have been
regarded as not being an infringement of their quorum or of his status
and role as "an umpire" as contemplated by the statute. A majority
award was authorized by the submission agreement, and in sustaining
the majority award under the statute the Court appears to have been in-
different as to whether or not one of that majority was the "umpire."
In 1868 in King v. Grey,70 the supreme court gave more express at-
tention to the identification of this umpire. Art. 65, Paschal's Digest
(now Art. 232) read as follows:
"That if the arbitrators chosen as aforesaid cannot agree, the arbitrators
shall select an umpire, and in case they disagree in the choice of an um-
pire, the justice or clerk may appoint an umpire, who shall be competent
to serve as an arbitrator, and who shall in like manner be sworn."'1
The court seemed certain, especially in view of the italicized portion of
the foregoing article, that the umpire took up the role of an arbitrator.
Said the court:
"This article expressly declares that this third person, called an umpire,
whether selected by the other arbitrators or the clerk, after being duly
sworn, shall be competent to serve as an arbitrator. Of course his pow-
ers as arbitrator are neither greater nor less than those of the other
arbitrators; and from the fact that the original arbitrators could not
agree, it is evident that it was contemplated by the statute that the
award would not be unanimous when a third party should be so selected,
and hence the proceedings by the arbitrators, after the appointment of
the umpire, would be precisely as if the three had been originally
chosen, and a majority was sufficient to form an award. '72
70 31 Tex. 22 (1868).
7 1 Italics supplied.
72 Id. at 27.
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It also is readily inferred from the report of this case that the court con-
sidered that both the original arbitrators and the umpire were necessary
to a quorum for the hearing. It may be noted in passing that it is worthy
of doubt that the italicized portion of article 65 as quoted by the court
had other reference than to the umpire having the qualifications of an
arbitrator as the matter is now expressed in article 232.
In the year prior to King v. Grey, however, in McHugh v. Peck,73 the
supreme court identified the umpire selected by the two arbitrators after
their disagreement as being an umpire to decide the total cause by him-
self without the arbitrators, indicated that he may do so without further
notice to the parties, and that he may decide on the evidence as presented
to the arbitrators, at least unless and until further hearing before him is
sought by the parties. Said the court in this connection:
"The record does not show certainly that the clerk appointed a time for
the umpire to enter upon the discharge of the duties incumbent on him
under the appointment. And, as he may act alone, there does not appear
to be any nrecessity for the clerk to designate the time the umpire shall
hear and determine the matter to be submitted to him.
"There is no provision in the law that a clerk shall appoint the time
for the umpire to enter upon the discharge of the duties incumbent on
him under the appointment. '74
And:
"If there were sufficient facts in the record upon which the umpire might
act with certainty in deciding the questions before him, no reason is
perceived why he might not make his decision on the facts which have
been ascertained by the arbitrators.' 75
On the other hand:
"If witnesses are to be examined, if testimony is to be received which
had not been previously submitted to the arbitrators, the parties should
have notice of the time and place the umpire would act under his
appointment. The umpire should see that all parties interested had
notice, so that they might appear before him."''
The court did not mention the Forshey case in connection with its
foregoing views or otherwise. Nor was McHugh v. Peck mentioned by
the court in King v. Grey.
A case holding contrary to McHugh v. Peck-especially as to the fore-
going views in that case relating to the right of rehearing before the um-
329 Tex. 141 (1867).
74 Id. at 147-8. Italics supplied.
75 Id.
70 Id. Italics supplied.
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pire-is Warren v. Tinsley.1 A United States circuit court held that,
when the arbitrators named by the parties had failed to agree after hear-
ing and an umpire was selected, there must be further hearing before the
umpire and arbitrators and due notice thereof given the parties. For
failure to accord such notice and hearing, and for failure to swear either
the arbitrators or the umpire "until after hearing and deciding the case,"
the award was vacated. The court reported the case and its ruling as
follows:
"The evidence in the case establishes that the arbitrators and the umpire
were not sworn until after hearing and deciding the case; also that
after the umpire was selected there was no notice given to the parties
of any hearing, nor was there any hearing or rehearing before the arbi-
trators and umpire; but, as stated by the umpire himself in the affidavit
on file, "the arbitrators gave him 'the court papers' and told him that
'they included all the evidence and depositions submitted to them' and
'he then examined very carefully and thoroughly every paper in said
case, including the said depositions, and having arrived at a conclusion
reported to said arbitrators that' he 'was ready to decide the case.' "78
The court concluded, after quoting the text of pertinent articles of the
statute as they were then worded that "the preliminary swearing of the
arbitrators and umpire and a rehearing and notice when the arbitrators
disagree and an umpire is chosen, are plainly required." The court went
on to add that "there may be some reason for holding that the failure to
swear the arbitrators in accordance with the statute was waived, but, in
our opinion, the failure to give a hearing to the parties cannot, under the
circumstances, be taken as waived."
The court further reported that the decisions in the Forshey case and
in McHugh v. Peck, were cited against its views in this case. The detail
of this citation is not reported. In this connection, however, the court
observed that those cases were decided before the addition to article 232
of the last clause thereof, providing that "the cause may be tried anew
at such time as the board of arbitrators thus constituted may designate,
with like proceedings as are prescribed in the preceding article," but it
noted that the clause was in the statute and effective when the submis-
sion in this case was concluded. It is not clear (nor did the court explain)
just why the addition of the foregoing clause to the text article had sig-
nificance in distinguishing those earlier cases from the present one with
respect to the issue before the court.
The foregoing decisions leave much to be desired as to the identifica-
tion of the "umpire." It seems clear that the statute with its frailties of
77 53 Fed. 689 (5th Cir. 1893).
7aId. at 691-2.
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draftsmanship is first in fault; and that still, notwithstanding the en-
deavors of the courts, it places undue burden upon the courts and es-
pecially upon litigants to give it useful meaning.
Article 233. Appeal from award
If a right of appeal is not expressly reserved in the original agree-
ment to arbitrate, no such right shall exist, but the decision of the arbi-
trators shall be final. If such right of appeal is reserved and either party
desires to appeal from such decision or award, he shall file his written
application to that effect with the justice or clerk, as the case may be,
on or before the return day of the term of the court next thereafter.
By omitting a reservation of right of appeal from an award, quite
clearly the statutory award can be made conclusive and final like a com-
mon law award. The matter was put as follows in Temple v. Riverland
Co.: 7
"Article 65 [Art. 233] provides if a right of appeal is not expressly re-
served in the original agreement to arbitrate, no such right shall exist,
"but the decision of the arbitrators shall be final." . . . If no right of
appeal is reserved and if the agreement is in substantial compliance
with the statute, then the award will, on motion, be made the judg-
ment of the court, unless it is impeached on equitable grounds for
fraud, or the like. . . . Our courts, from the earliest, have held under
statutory arbitration, in the absence of fraud, misconduct, and the like,
the award is final and conclusive upon matters submitted for the de-
termination of the arbitrators." 0
In another case (in which there was no reservation of right of appeal
from the award) the court outlined the status of the award as follows:
"From the fact that the parties to the arbitration did not reserve the
right of appeal in the agreement for arbitration, there could be no ap-
peal from the award, and the proceedings of the arbitrators were finalin their nature, and the duty of the judge was to enter up a judgment
on the same, or, if it should be apparent that such causes exist as would
not authorize a court to enter such judgment, then to declare the pro-ceedings null and of no effect, either in whole or in part, and recommit
for further award."'ff
Even though right of appeal from the award is expressly stipulated
against, the trial court should allow common law and equitable grounds
7 228 S.W. 605 (Tex.Giv.App. 1921); Evans v. DeSpain, 37 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Giv.
App. 1930) (award set aside because the arbitrators were found to have exceeded their
authority under the submission, and the matters awarded in excess of their authority
were not severable from those that were within the submission); semble, Fortune v.
Killebrew, 86 Tex. 172, 23 S.W. 976 (1893).
s d. at 607.
8 King v. Grey, 31 Tex. 22,926 (1868).
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for vacation of the award to be asserted against it. In Payne v. Metz"
the submission agreement expressly provided that there should be no
appeal from the award. Motion was made by the successful party to have
the award entered as the judgment of the court. Before this motion was
granted the defendant filed a petition in which he alleged, to quote the
reported statement of facts, "gross mistakes, stating the particulars, on
the part of the arbitrators, which resulted in great injury to him and
prayed that the award be not entered as the judgment of the court, but
be set aside . . . and for general relief." The supreme court remarked
as follows:
"The appellant [moving to have judgment entered] . . . insisted on
having the award made the judgment of the Court, not because it was
not as inequitable, unjust and iniquitous as it was charged to be, but
simply because it was the award of the arbitrators, and the parties,
confiding in their integrity, impartiality and intelligence, as the
Judges of their own choice, had not reserved in their submission the
right of appeal, but had expressly waived it. But though no appeal
was reserved, and though the right of appeal was expressly waived,
that was not a waiver of the right to have an award which should be
free from the just imputation of fraud, partiality or flagrant injustice
and wrong ...
"The Court could not revise the decision of the arbitrators, as upon
appeal, it is true; but, as a Court of Equity, could interpose its power
of preventive justice, to arrest the commission of flagrant wrong; and
could set aside the award, for the causes which, according to the well
settled principles which govern a Court of Chancery in such cases,
would warrant and require the setting aside of an award. The applica-
tion was made in the proper manner, by petition, and was in due and
proper time. If the party aggrieved had acquiesced in permitting the
award to be made the judgment of the Court without objection, it
could only have been questioned for the causes for which any other
judgment of the Court may be impeached. . . but not having been
made the judgment of the Court, it could be impeached for the causes
which in a Court of Chancery are held to be sufficient for such purpose.
And it derives no additional sanctity from the fact that the statute has
prescribed no mode by which it may be impeached."'' s
Concerning the final action to be taken the court continued as follows:
"Where such a case is made out, the court should not, as in this case,
simply refuse to make the award the judgment of the court, but should
set it aside."
By way of caution to this exercise of general equitable powers over
statutory awards as set forth above, the court added these further general
comments in the foregoing opinion:
82 14 Tex. 56 (1855).
83 Id. at 58-9.
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"But the court should interpose in this class of cases with great caution;
and never, except in a case of urgent necessity to prevent the consumma-
tion of a fraud, or some great and manifest wrong and injustice. It is not
every error or mistake of law or fact, which will warrant the setting aside
of an award. The law, therefore, requires that, to authorize the inter-
ference of a Court of Equity in the case of awards, there must appear to
have been fraud or partiality, misconduct or gross mistake committed on
the part of the arbitrators, to the manifest injury of the party com-
plaining.""8
The Texas courts also have emphasized that objections to an award
must be pleaded specifically and distinctly or they will be disregarded.
In Alexander & Beauchamp v. Mulhall & Scaling"5 the Commission of
Appeals declared the rule as follows:
"While our courts allow matters to be pleaded to set aside an award upon
the hearing of the motion to enter it as a judgment, they also require that
such matters shall be specifically charged, that the fraud, or misconduct
or mistake made by the arbitrators, shall be set out distinctly.... Here
misconduct is attempted to be charged, but how? In hearing unsworn
testimony; but what the testimony was, or whether it was material, we
are not informed. Again, that the arbitrators allowed documents to be
submitted to them after the case had been closed. What documents?
Were they material? How did they or were they calculated to affect the
result? We think the court did right in disregarding this answer."88
In Bowden v. Crow,8 7 the objections charged "in general terms that the
arbitrators in making same were actuated by gross partiality, fraud and
mistake." Exception to the petition for its generality was sustained. The
court said:
"It is well settled in this state, that where it is sought to set aside an award
by arbitrators on the grounds above set forth, the facts constituting the
objection to the award must be specifically averred; and in order to pre-
vent the award from being made the judgment of the court in compli-
ance with the agreement, it is necessary that the facts alleged be sufficient
to vacate it when impeached in a court of equity."""
Concerning an arbitration and award under a submission providing for
an appeal from the award and the "trial de novo," the supreme court re-
marked as follows in the case of Shultz & Bro. v. Lempert.5
"An examination of the statute makes it plain that by this right of ap-
peal is meant a right, on making written and timely application therefor,
84 Id. at 60.
85 1 Posay UN _P. CAs. 764 (Tex.Comm.App. 1881).
86 Id. at 768.
87 21 S.W. 612 (Tex.Civ.App. 1893).
88 Id. at 613; see also, Eubankv. Bostick, 194 S.W. 214 (Tex.Civ.App. 1917).
89 55 Tex. 273 (1881).
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and having the opposite party served with citation, to have the cause
"stand for trial de novo, as in ordinary cases." Rev. St. Arts. 51, 52.
"Trial de novo does not mean a trial on appeal and on nothing but the
record to correct errors, but does mean a trial of the entire case anew,
hearing evidence, whether additional or not.... Strangely, yet clearly,
the statute allows the parties, by reserving the right of appeal, the power
of nullifying the award, if dissatisfied therewith, and of having the case
tried anew without regard to the agreement to arbitrate or the award
made. With this right of appeal reserved, the arbitration becomes nothing
more than an experimental attempt to satisfy both parties; and when the
failure of that attempt is shown by the application and citation before
spoken of, the case stands for trial as if there had been no agreement to
arbitrate." 90
The remaining articles of the arbitration statute are set out in the
notes.91
CONCLUSIONS
Certainly the Texas courts have done their part to make the general
arbitration statute a useful facility for the arbitration of causes there-
under. Perhaps, moreover, the shortcomings of the statute are more
noticeable now than at the earlier times when it was enacted and, from
time to time, amended. In view of the significance of the State of Texas
both commercially and industrially, it is submitted that the legislature,
in furtherance of article 16 of the Constitution, should conceive and en-
9 Id. at 277.
91 Art. 234. In case of appeal. When an application for appeal is filed, as prescribed
in the preceding article the same shall be noted on the docket of the court, and the op-
posite party served with a citation, as in ordinary cases of suit by petition. Upon return
of service upon the opposite party, the cause shall stand for trial de novo as in ordinary
cases.
Art. 235. Costs. The arbitrators may award the costs to either party; and, if their de-
cision or award is silent as to costs, the same shall be taxed equally against both parties.
Art. 236. Refusing to proceed. After an agreement to arbitrate is filed, the parties
thereto shall be bound to that mode of trial under the following penalties, to wit: Such
agreement may be pleaded in bar to any suit thereafter brought by a plaintiff in such
agreement for the same cause of action, when such plaintiff has refused to proceed
under such agreement; and said agreement may be pleaded in bar to any right claimed
or defense set up by defendant in such agreement who has refused to proceed thereunder,
where such right or defense existed at the time of filing such agreement.
Art. 237. Corporation, etc., may arbitrate. The provisions of this title shall apply to
corporations as well as natural persons; and executors, administrators and guardians
may also consent to an arbitration of any controversy or matter of dispute relating to
or affecting their respective trusts, with the consent of the court in which such ad-
ministration or guardianship is pending.
Art. 238. Mode not exclusive. Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting the
existing right of parties to arbitrate their differences in such mode as they may select.
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act a more comprehensive and flexible arbitration statute. It should, it
is believed, embrace written provisions in commercial contracts and in
collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate future disputes and writ-
ten agreements of submission of existing disputes and provide summary
remedies to make them irrevocable and specifically enforceable, also
provisions governing the conduct of the arbitration to assure fully the
minimum standards of full opportunity of hearing after reasonable
notice, also for summary remedies to enforce honest and competent
awards and summary remedies to vacate awards designated causes em-
bracing dishonest and incompetent arbitral proceedings and awards. In
this connection it is suggested consideration be given to the general
pattern of the more modern arbitration statutes of California, Connec-
ticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington,
Wisconsin, and of the United States arbitration statute.9 -
92 See further, Sturges, Some General Standards for a State Arbitration Statute, 7
ARBITRATION JOURNAL 194 (1952).
